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As consumer technology becomes increasingly complex, 
so too does the manufacturer’s task in assessing the scope 
of its duty to warn of potential dangers.  A recent decision 
by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 
Rosa v. Taser International, Inc., offers a prime illustration 
of this challenge through its analysis of a hazard posed by 
Taser weaponry. The Rosa court highlights a point of 
uncertainty in this area of law: courts typically determine 
which hazards were knowable at the time of manufacture 
as a matter of law, but they sometimes do so in the absence 
of a comprehensive standard. 
This Article evaluates the Ninth Circuit’s approach as a 
potential model for other courts. After a brief survey of 
U.S. products liability law pertaining to the “knowability” 
requirement, this Article analyzes the Rosa decision. 
Although the Rosa court bemoans the absence of a 
comprehensive standard for making this determination in 
California, the court’s reasoning implicitly suggests a 
three-part test that could serve as a model in California 
and elsewhere. Such a standard would reduce the legal 
* Scott P. Kennedy, J.D., is an associate attorney at Reinisch Wilson Weier, 
P.C. specializing in Washington state litigation and workers’ compensation. The 
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uncertainty faced by manufacturers assessing the extent of 
their duty and by plaintiffs assessing the strength of their 
claims. 
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Late on August 29, 2004, local police in Del Rey Oaks, 
California, responded to a call reporting a disturbed wanderer; his 
name was Michael Rosa.1 After a tense confrontation in which he 
threatened police, Mr. Rosa fled.2 The pursuit ended only after 
police deployed their Taser stun guns, and it took seven or eight 
1 See Rosa v. Taser Int’l., Inc., 684 F.3d 941, 944-45 (9th Cir. 2012) 
(upholding the “state of the art” defense, in favor of the defendant, and refusing 
to extend the manufacturers’ duty to warn). 
2 Id. 
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shocks to immobilize Mr. Rosa, perhaps because he was under the 
influence of methamphetamines.3 Mr. Rosa stopped breathing and 
was transported to a hospital, where he died of cardiac arrest.4 The 
physician who performed his autopsy listed “ventricular 
arrhythmia . . . due to methamphetamine intoxication” as the cause 
of death, adding “Taser application and arrest by police” as a 
contributing cause.5  However, Mr. Rosa’s death was later linked 
to metabolic acidosis, a condition in which extreme physical 
exertion causes lactic acid to accumulate in the muscles more 
quickly than the body can dispose of it.6 The condition makes 
cardiac arrest more likely.7 
Mr. Rosa’s family sued the stun gun’s manufacturer.8 When 
their case reached the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, the court 
held that any risk of acidosis posed by the Taser weaponry had not 
been knowable at the time of manufacture, thus relieving its 
manufacturer of liability for Mr. Rosa’s death.9 
In all but a handful of states, a products liability action 
claiming a manufacturer failed to warn of its product’s hazards 
would not succeed unless those hazards were known or knowable 
at the time of manufacture. Determining whether a risk is or was 
knowable can be a challenge for litigants and courts. That 
challenge promises to become greater with the addition of complex 
new technologies to a marketplace already crowded with 
undiscovered hazards. The court’s opinion in Rosa forthrightly 
acknowledges this problem: it assessed the knowability of the 
Taser’s risks in the absence of a comprehensive legal standard. 
However, this Article argues that an analysis of Rosa’s reasoning 
offers insight into what form a standard might ultimately take. 





8 Id. at 950 (the Rosas asserted that Michael died because the stun gun’s 
manufacturer “had provided an inadequate warning of the dangers of the product 
to the officers who used it”); id. at n.4 (The Rosas also sued the officers and 
municipalities involved, but those claims were not at issue in the Ninth Circuit’s 
opinion).   
9 Id. at 950. 
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Part I briefly surveys U.S. products liability law pertaining to 
the duty to warn. Part II analyzes the Ninth Circuit’s decision in 
Rosa as an illustration of the problems involved in assessing 
knowability. It then discusses Rosa’s potential relevance to the 
development of a comprehensive standard. Finally, Part III offers a 
recommendation: the Rosa court’s rationale implicitly suggests a 
three-part standard for determining a risk’s knowability as a matter 
of law that courts would do well to adopt. 
 
I. PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND THE DUTY TO WARN 
 
Products liability constitutes a relatively recent development in 
U.S. jurisprudence,10 and its common law evolution produced 
several claims rooted in different theories of recovery. A cause of 
action for products liability may be pursued under any of three 
basic theories of tort law: negligence, strict liability, or breach of 
warranty.11 Although the rationale and elements of each vary, 
these theories all require some proof that a product is defective.12 
The nature of that defect can take several different forms: it might 
be a mistake in manufacturing, a deficiency of design, or a failure 
to adequately instruct about proper use or warn of potential risks.13 
These alternate forms of defect provide plaintiffs with a variety of 
claims through which to impose liability. 
This Article is primarily concerned with claims directed at a 
manufacturer’s failure to warn. Both negligence and strict liability 
theories give rise to a manufacturer’s duty to warn of a product’s 
dangers, but the plaintiff’s choice of theory makes little difference, 
as the standard for determining liability is similar under both.14 
10 63 AM. JUR. 2D Products Liability § 1 (2012). 
11 72A C.J.S. Product Liability § 2 (2012). 
12 63 AM. JUR. 2D Products Liability § 7 (2012). 
13 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY, §2 (1998) 
(“A defect in manufacturing occurs where a product, in its final manufactured 
form, departs from the intended design; a defect in design, by contrast, occurs 
where the original design for a product posed foreseeable risks that could have 
been avoided by adopting an alternate design.”).  
14 See id. (“Under a strict liability theory, a manufacturer may be liable for 
its failure to warn of a product’s potentially dangerous propensities when it has 
reason to anticipate the danger. Under a negligence theory, a manufacturer may 
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Therefore, this Article will sometimes refer to the duty to warn 
without distinguishing between the two theoretical forms it may 
take. 
 
A.  The Duty to Warn of a Product’s Dangers 
 
Manufacturers and suppliers are subject to a duty to warn 
consumers if a failure to do so could render their products 
defective or unreasonably dangerous.15 This duty may be imposed 
where a product is latently defective, dangerous for its intended 
use, or inherently dangerous.16 If its product meets any of these 
criteria, a manufacturer breaches its duty if it either fails to warn 
entirely or if its warnings are inadequate.17 Judging the adequacy 
of warnings, in turn, is a task for the trier of fact. Using a standard 
of reasonableness, the trier of fact must determine whether the 
warning was sufficiently specific and explicit to communicate an 
awareness of the relevant danger to the product’s typical 
consumer.18 
However, even where a product proves to be dangerous, the 
duty to warn of that danger has limits. Manufacturers are not 
obliged to educate ignorant consumers of inherent dangers that 
would be obvious to the typical user,19 so a knife maker need not 
warn consumers about a cutting hazard. A manufacturer is also 
under no duty to warn of non-obvious dangers if the manufacturer 
itself had no way to foresee the danger at the time of sale—the so-
called “knowability” requirement.20 But determining precisely 
be liable for failing to warn under circumstances where a reasonably prudent 
manufacturer would have warned. In practice, however, these standards impose 
a similar burden upon the plaintiff’s case.”).  
15 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY, §2, cmt. i 
(1998). 
16 72A C.J.S. Product Liability § 26 (2012). 
17 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS, supra note 15. 
18  Id. 
19 Id. at cmt. j. 
20 Id. at cmt. m (“A manufacturer is not liable for failing to warn of risks 
associated with a product’s use if those risks were not foreseeable at the time of 
sale or manufacture. However, this bar to liability most often arises in the 
context of prescription drugs, medical devices, and toxic chemicals, because the 
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what this latter requirement means for manufacturers, and for 
plaintiffs, can be difficult. 
 
B.  Known or Knowable Dangers 
 
It is not uncommon for a product to enter the marketplace 
without warnings only to have a hazard become apparent after 
widespread use. In such a case, the majority of courts will hold a 
manufacturer liable for its failure to warn only if the hazard was 
either known or knowable to that manufacturer at the time of 
sale.21 Whether the danger was known to the manufacturer is a 
simple question, at least conceptually: a known danger implies 
actual knowledge and can be shown through evidence that a 
manufacturer was aware of the specific danger but negligently or 
willfully disregarded that knowledge.22 Determining what was 
knowable to the manufacturer is more complex. Whether a danger 
was knowable amounts to a question of whether the manufacturer 
had constructive knowledge of that danger, implying that it should 
have known.23 
 
1. The Requisite of Knowability 
 
 In most jurisdictions, showing that a danger was knowable is 
really a question of whether it was actually known to experts in the 
field.24 Put another way, if the “state of the art” was such that 
risks attendant to use of these products are often difficult to predict. By contrast, 
in cases involving mechanical products, the foreseeability of risk is rarely an 
issue because a mechanical device’s risks ‘are generally known or reasonably 
knowable by experts in the field.’”); id. (“Taser weaponry would seem to be 
among the rare exceptions to this generalization because of the complex and 
relatively novel way in which it interacts with human physiology. In this sense, 
it functions, somewhat ironically, more like a medical device.”); see also 63A 
AM. JUR. 2D Products Liability § 1039 (2012). 
21 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS, supra note 15, Reporter’s Note to cmt. 
m (1998); Charles C. Marvel, Strict Products Liability: Liability for Failure to 
Warn as Dependent on Defendant’s Knowledge of Danger, 33 A.L.R. 4th 368, 
§3 (1984). 
22 Id. 
23 See generally 63 AM. JUR. 2D Products Liability § 1039 (2012). 
24 See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS, supra note 15.  
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science had not discovered the problem, a manufacturer will 
generally not be held responsible.25 For instance, California courts 
follow a rule that holds a manufacturer to the skill and knowledge 
of an expert within its particular field of business; this, in turn, 
requires the manufacturer to keep abreast of scientific discoveries 
relevant to that field.26 Although the rhetorical formulation of this 
rule varies widely between jurisdictions,27 it varies little on one 
point of substance: none will hold defendants liable for failing to 
warn of a risk that was unknown and unknowable to a reasonable 
expert at the time of sale.28 In this sense, California’s formulation 
is fairly representative of the norm. 
The knowability rule imposes an evidentiary burden on 
plaintiffs to show that contemporaneous, publicly available 
scientific research had identified the danger.29 Plaintiffs can 
introduce expert testimony or published research to satisfy this 
25 Marvel, supra note 21; 63 AM. JUR. 2D Products Liability § 1040 (2012). 
Although an “overwhelming majority of jurisdictions” have adopted this general 
requirement in one form or another, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS, supra 
note 15, the precise language they use to formulate it varies considerably. For 
instance, some refer to a “state of the art,” characterizing it as a manufacturer’s 
affirmative defense, and others to a plaintiff’s burden of demonstrating the 
knowledge of experts in the field. Compare, e.g., Fibreboard Corp. v. Fenton, 
845 P.2d 1168, 1172 (Colo. 1993) (“We agree with the petitioners that state-of-
the-art evidence is properly admissible to establish that a product is not defective 
and unreasonably dangerous because of a failure to warn.”), with Woodhill v. 
Parke Davis & Co., 402 N.E.2d 194, 198 (Ill. 1980) (“We perceive that 
requiring a plaintiff to plead and prove that the defendant manufacturer knew or 
should have known of the danger that caused the injury, and that the defendant 
manufacturer failed to warn plaintiff of that danger, is a reasonable 
requirement.”). For the purposes of this article, however, cataloging the variety 
in these formulations is of little consequence: it will suffice to observe that none 
in this majority will hold defendants liable for failing to warn of a risk that was 
unforeseeable to experts at the time of sale. 
26 See, e.g., Christofferson v. Kaiser Found. Hosp., 15 Cal. App. 3d 75 
(1971) (approving the use of a jury instruction indicating that the manufacturer 
of a prescription drug is liable for failing to warn of its side effects only if they 
were known to experts in the field or to science).   
27 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS, supra note 15, Reporter’s Note to 
cmt. m. 
28 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS, supra note 15. 
29 63 AM. JUR. 2D Products Liability § 1040 (2012). 
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burden.30 Asbestos litigation provides a good illustration of this: 
asbestos manufacturers have been held liable where medical 
experts testified that they were aware of the risks asbestos products 
posed at the time of installation.31 
To summarize the rule of knowability, it might be more 
accurate to assert not that manufacturers must warn of knowable 
risks, but rather that they must warn whenever they, the scientific 
community, or the experts in their industry had actual knowledge 
of the risks.32 In this sense, “knowable risk” is a misleading term 
of art—it refers not to risks that manufacturers should have 
discovered through their own diligent efforts, but rather to risks 
that experts already had discovered.33 
30 Id. 
31 See, e.g., Moran v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 691 F.2d 811 (6th Cir. 
1982) (applying Ohio law). 
32 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS, supra note 15, Reporter’s Note to cmt. 
m (1998) (“This reality is an anomalous one given that many claims regarding a 
manufacturer’s failure to warn are rooted in strict liability rather than 
negligence. In the early development of American products liability, both the 
Restatement and several prominent scholars urged that a plaintiff alleging a 
failure to warn should not have to prove that a manufacturer knew or should 
have known of the risk at issue. Rather, this knowledge should be imputed to the 
defendant once the plaintiff shows that the risk was a reality. But that notion 
‘has not worn well with time.’ In more recent years, ‘given the criticism that has 
been leveled against the imputation of knowledge doctrine and the relatively 
thin judicial support for it, it is [now] rejected as a doctrinal matter.’”); see infra 
note 29 (“However, a small minority of jurisdictions continue to show a 
willingness to impute knowledge of the risk to a defendant at trial.”).  
33 See E. L. Kellett, Manufacturer’s Duty to Test or Inspect as Affecting His 
Liability for Product-Caused Injury, 6 A.L.R.3d 91, §2 (1966) (describing the 
existence of the duty to test as “well settled.” However, with regard to what 
manufacturers should have discovered, they are not entirely free from 
obligation: manufacturers often also have a limited duty to test for yet unknown 
dangers. Rooted in negligence, this duty requires a manufacturer to conduct the 
tests and inspections of its product that reasonable care would require in order to 
find any risks associated with its intended use. In general, courts determine the 
extent of testing required by considering both the physical and economic 
feasibility of additional testing, and the degree of danger that could be 
anticipated from forgoing additional testing). But cf. 63 AM. JUR. 2D Products 
Liability § 310 (2012) (citing Viguers v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 2003 837 
A.2d 534 (PA Super. 2003)) (noting that there is also some limited authority 
suggesting that “failure to test” is not a viable claim because the duty to test is 
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2. Jurisdictions Rejecting the Knowability Requirement 
 
In contrast to the above rule, only a few cases have indicated 
that a danger need not have been known to the manufacturer, the 
business industry, or the scientific community for liability to attach 
for failure to warn.34 These outlier decisions have appeared in 
Missouri,35 New Jersey,36 Pennsylvania,37 Hawaii,38 and 
Washington State.39 
In Little v. PPG Industries, Inc., the Washington Court of 
Appeals adopted a rule imposing liability on manufacturers who 
subsumed by other theories of products liability).  
34 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS, supra note 15 (explaining that 
“[s]everal states take the position that a defendant manufacturer is charged with 
knowledge available at time of trial without regard to whether the defendant 
knew or reasonably could have known of the risk,” and going on to list cases 
from Hawaii, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and Washington); see also Marvel, 
supra note 12 (stating that only “a very few” cases have held against the 
majority rule). 
35 Elmore v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 673 S.W.2d 434, 438 (Mo. 1984) (“[T]he 
law in Missouri holds that state of the art evidence has no bearing on the 
outcome of a strict liability claim; the sole subject of inquiry is the defective 
condition of the product and not the manufacturer’s knowledge, negligence or 
fault.”). 
36 Beshada v. Johns-Manville Products Corp, 90 N.J. 191 (1982) (“[I]n strict 
liability cases, culpability is irrelevant, and, in failure-to-warn cases, state-of-
the-art defense is not allowable, and thus the medical community’s presumed 
unawareness of dangers of asbestos was not a defense.”). 
37 Pegg v Gen. Motors Corp., 391 A.2d 1074, 1083 n.10 (explaining, in 
dictum, that a seller must provide adequate warnings of a risk “regardless of 
whether the seller knew or had reason to know of the risks and limitations”). 
38 In re Hawaii Federal Asbestos Cases, 699 F. Supp. 233, 235 (D. Haw. 
1988) (“It is clear that under Hawaii law, ‘in a strict liability action, state-of-the-
art evidence is not admissible for the purpose of establishing whether the seller 
knew or reasonably should have known of the dangerousness of his or her 
product.’”) (citation omitted). 
39  Little v. PPG Indus., Inc., 19 Wash. App. 812 (1978) (holding that 
failure of an employer, who has actual knowledge of a hazard, to warn 
employees may constitute a superseding cause and that foreseeability of the 
dangers involved in the use of a product is not relevant to a strict liability 
theory). 
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failed to warn of a danger even where that danger was unknown.40 
The court reasoned that, because strict liability focuses on the 
nature of the product rather than the reasonableness of the 
producer’s conduct, it was inappropriate to consider what the 
defendant knew or should have known in this kind of case.41 Even 
in these jurisdictions, therefore, actual or constructive knowledge 
of the danger would always be required under a negligence action 
for failure to warn; it is only in strict liability that knowability is 
separable from the duty to warn.42 
Other cases from these jurisdictions have followed similar 
reasoning. The New Jersey Supreme Court, for instance, rejected 
the “state of the art” defense43 in Beshada v. Johns-Manville 
Products Corp.44 The court noted that culpability is irrelevant in 
strict liability, and that the state of the art defense is therefore 
inappropriate in strict liability cases because it amounts to an 
assertion of blamelessness.45 The court also considered policy 
rationales, stating that it was preferable to distribute the costs of a 
product’s dangers among manufacturers rather than consumers, 
and that this policy would have the added benefit of incentivizing 
40 Id. at 822, mod. on other grounds, 92 Wash.2d 118 (1979). (In Little, a 
widow was suing the manufacturer of a chemical solvent that had killed her 
husband while he worked in a steel plant. She alleged that the manufacturer’s 
failure to warn of the solvent’s dangerous propensities had rendered it 
unreasonably dangerous, but the manufacturer countered that those propensities 
had been unknown). 
41 See id. 
42 See Marvel, supra note 17 (explaining that, while the vast majority of 
cases have required the danger to have been knowable before imposing strict 
liability, “when a negligence theory is applied, there is no question that actual or 
constructive knowledge is an essential element”). 
43 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS, supra note 15, Reporter’s Note to 
cmt. m (The “state of the art” defense is the name sometimes given to a 
manufacturer’s argument that it is not liable for a failure to warn of a defect 
because that defect was not known to the industry or scientific community); 63A 
AM. JUR. 2D Products Liability § 1007 (2012) (However, note that the phrase 
“state of the art” also arises, with a somewhat different meaning, in the context 
of a claim for defective design. There, it “sets the parameters for determining the 
feasibility of an alternative, safer product design”). 
44 90 N.J. 191 (1982). 
45 Id. at 204-205. 
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stronger investments in safety research.46 
 
3. Knowability as a Question of Law 
 
Determining what dangers were knowable to the manufacturer 
is generally a task for the court. Like most legal duties, the 
question of whether a manufacturer owed a duty to warn is settled 
as a matter of law, while questions about whether the manufacturer 
breached that duty are left to the jury.47 Only in some 
circumstances, such as when testimony regarding the state of the 
art is conflicting, will the jury play a role in the knowability 
determination.48 
 
II. THE LESSONS OF ROSA V. TASER INTERNATIONAL 
 
Rosa offers a valuable illustration of the limits in the 
knowability inquiry of the duty to warn. However, it also has the 
potential to serve as a model for crafting a comprehensive standard 
for determining knowability. 
 
A.  Determining Knowability in the Absence of a  
Comprehensive Standard 
 
The Rosa court held that the risk of metabolic acidosis posed 
by Taser weaponry was not knowable to the defendants at the time 
of the gun’s manufacture in 2003.49 It drew this conclusion from 
an analysis of the plaintiff’s scientific evidence, which consisted of 
four peer-reviewed journal articles. As discussed above, to show 
that the defendant had constructive knowledge of the risk of 
acidosis, the plaintiff needed to produce evidence that the scientific 
46 Id. at 207. 
47 63 AM. JUR. 2D Products Liability § 1107 (2012). 
48 Id.   
49  Rosa v. Taser Int’l., Inc., 684 F.3d 941, 950 (9th Cir. 2012) (although 
the plaintiffs’ relied on peer reviewed articles to support the claim that the risk 
of metabolic acidosis was “known or knowable” in 2003, the literature did not 
present a triable issue with respect to notice because it consisted of untested 
hypothesis and failed to establish a causal link between Tasers and metabolic 
acidosis). 
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community had discovered the danger when the Taser that killed 
Mr. Rosa was manufactured and distributed to police in 2003. The 
court, therefore, was tasked with determining what the scientific 
community knew in 2003 based on this evidence. 
 
1. Lack of a Comprehensive Standard 
 
In Rosa, the Ninth Circuit began its analysis by noting that the 
California courts “have never announced a comprehensive 
standard of when a particular risk is knowable.”50 The court 
nonetheless furnished a few “key considerations”: in general, 
manufacturers are held to the knowledge and skill of experts in 
their field, and they must keep abreast of all relevant scientific 
discoveries.51 On the other hand, manufacturers need not warn of 
every conceivable risk, no matter how “speculative, conjectural, or 
tentative,” because requiring them to do so would dilute the value 
of any warning by flooding the marketplace with needless ones.52 
Therefore, the essence of what it means for a risk to have been 
knowable in California lies at some uncharted point between these 
two extremes. 
At first glance, this absence of a comprehensive standard 
would seem to be a problem unique to California. But in truth, the 
Rosa court, perhaps unwittingly, may have put its finger on a note 
of general uncertainty regarding what it means for a risk to have 
been knowable in the failure-to-warn context.  
There are two longstanding points of confusion surrounding the 
knowability requirement that may lie at the root of the uncertainty 
in California. The first problem is a rhetorical one: as discussed 
above, “knowable risk” is a misnomer lacking meaningful 
definition in this context. As early as 1983, the term has been 
described as one embodying a fundamental “definitional problem” 
in products liability: does it refer to actual knowledge, 
discoverable knowledge, scientifically available knowledge, or 
something else entirely?53 Indeed, “[q]uestions of this sort tempt 
50 Id. at 946. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. 
53 See, e.g., John W. Wade, On the Effect in Product Liability of Knowledge 
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one to cut the Gordian knot in frustration and to say that anything 
now known was knowable at the earlier time.”54 “Scientifically 
available knowledge” may be a close approximation of the true 
meaning of what is knowable in this context, but even that falls 
short because the necessary knowledge need not be of a well-
established fact—it may be of the sort that a reasonable expert 
should have inferred from the information available.55 Therefore, 
even in strict liability cases, to give this term meaning one must 
sometimes borrow from negligence and say that a “knowable risk” 
is, at a minimum, one that a reasonably prudent person should have 
anticipated under the circumstances.56 
That observation leads to the second point of theoretical 
confusion at the knowability requirement’s roots: while failure-to-
warn claims are typically brought in strict liability, the knowability 
analysis has taken the form of a negligence standard in one 
important respect.57 A claim rooted in strict liability would not 
generally require any proof about the unreasonableness of the 
defendant’s conduct, nor would it permit the defendant to deflect 
liability by pointing to the degree of care it exercised. However, in 
the interest of fairness and to promote the development of new 
products, courts that embrace the knowability requirement have 
permitted manufacturers to excuse their failure to warn by arguing 
that, when identifying risks that would require a warning, they 
conformed to the state of the art and observed all scientifically 
available knowledge.58 This effectively incorporates a 
Unavailable Prior to Marketing, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 734, 749-50 (1983). Dean 
John Wade is a preeminent scholar in the field of products liability. The 
Restatement describes both him and W. Page Keeton (see infra note 55) as being 
“extremely influential in the early development of products liability law,” and it 
cites to their work frequently. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS, supra note 15, 
Reporter’s Note to cmt. m.  
54 See, e.g., Wade, supra note 52. 
55 Id. 
56 Id. 
57 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS, supra note 15, Reporter’s Note to 
cmt. m (explaining that, although failure-to-warn claims are typically situated in 
strict liability in a formal sense, it is now of a peculiar or paradoxical sort that 
incorporates aspects of negligence. This has created some theoretical confusion). 
58 See Ellen Wertheimer, The Biter Bit Unknowable Dangers, The Third 
Restatement, and the Reinstatement of Liability Without Fault, 70 BROOK. L. 
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reasonableness component into what would otherwise be a strict 
liability analysis, thereby confusing the boundaries and creating a 
hybrid claim.59 
This blurring between strict liability and negligence theory can 
complicate a failure-to-warn claim and its evidentiary 
requirements. “The task of identifying, for strict liability purposes, 
the risks of which a reasonable man could justifiably be unaware 
but that were scientifically knowable is an almost impossible 
one.”60 This challenge is more than academic; it can also be quite 
costly. For instance, “[a]n enormous amount of the time of courts, 
investigators, and lawyers can be expended in an effort to ascertain 
whether a drug like Aralene, the arthritis drug, involved a risk of 
blindness that could have been known prior to experience with its 
use on human beings.”61 If the failure-to-warn claim were rooted 
in true strict liability, then the question of the risk’s foreseeability, 
and of the manufacturer’s reasonableness and prudence in 
ascertaining it, would be moot. Rooting the claim in true 
REV. 889, 915-23 (2005) (discussing courts’ retreat from true strict products 
liability in the failure-to-warn claim toward one concerned with a risk’s 
knowability. In essence, courts were concerned that disregarding a risk’s 
knowability would give rise to absolute liability: if manufacturers can be held 
liable for unknowable risks, they often reasoned, this would create liability even 
in the absence of defect, thereby making manufacturers the insurers of their 
products. This, combined with a desire to foster innovation and new 
technologies in the marketplace, drove courts toward the modern knowability 
requirement. Wertheimer takes issue with this line of reasoning, arguing for a 
return to true strict liability). 
59 See Richard McCormick, Pharmaceutical Manufacturer’s Duty to Warn 
of Adverse Drug Reactions, 66 DEF. COUNS. J. 59, 63-64 (1999) (discussing the 
blurring distinction between negligence and strict liability in this context). This 
blurring has also been explicitly acknowledged by California, whose Supreme 
Court has explained that, while there remains a distinct strict liability claim for 
failure to warn, this claim is more or less a hybrid between strict liability and 
negligence principles. Id. at n.31 (citing Carlin v. Superior Court, 920 P.2d 
1347, 1350 (Cal. 1996)). 
60 W. Page Keeton, Products Liability—Inadequacy of Information, 48 TEX. 
L. REV. 398, 408-09 (1970). Keeton made this observation as part of his broader 
argument that failure-to-warn claims ought to proceed in true strict liability. To 
this end, he supported the imputed knowledge approach. See supra note 32 
(discussing the imputed knowledge approach and its modern disfavor). 
61 Id. 
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negligence, by contrast, would likely require courts and litigants to 
simply analyze the reasonableness of a manufacturer’s conduct, 
and the care they took, in identifying and warning of risks. But the 
knowability requirement seems to require something in between 
the two: could the defendant have known of this risk in advance? 
Such a question requires courts to do much more than simply 
assessing whether the risk is real (as they would under strict 
liability) or whether the defendant’s conduct was reasonable under 
a chosen standard of care (as they would under negligence). 
Instead, it requires them to consider an almost epistemological 
question.  
California law may be no worse off than most states with 
respect to this confusion. When asking whether a risk was 
knowable to the manufacturer, most courts seem really to be asking 
if it was actually known to anyone, whether it be to practitioners of 
the relevant art, experts in the field, the scientific community, or 
some other abstraction.62 Therefore, because California has at least 
clarified that manufacturers are held to the knowledge and skill of 
experts in their field and must keep abreast of all relevant scientific 
discoveries, it has done as much as most jurisdictions to establish a 
comprehensive standard. For this reason, as the Rosa court seems 
to have identified, all courts embracing some form of this 
requirement could do more to clarify what precisely they mean, 
and what they will require of litigants, when referring to a risk’s 
knowability. 
 
2. Assessing the State of the Art through Contemporaneous 
Research 
 
Having defined the broad contours of a standard, the Rosa 
court then applied it to four peer-reviewed scientific journal 
articles the plaintiff supplied in an attempt to determine whether 
the acidosis risk was known in 2003. The court first rejected two of 
the articles because they did not tie the risk of acidosis directly to 
Taser technology: one merely highlighted the dangers of metabolic 
62 See supra note 21 (describing the variety in rhetorical formulations used 
across jurisdictions).  
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acidosis by showing that the condition correlates with a form of 
cardiac arrhythmia, and the other demonstrated a correlation 
between acidosis deaths and police custody generally.63 In other 
words, neither identified Tasers as a cause of acidosis.  
The court rejected the plaintiff’s other two articles because 
they offered only hypothetical conjecture about the Taser/acidosis 
link rather than tested conclusions; they merely suggested that 
Taser technology might pose an acidosis risk. One article, after 
finding previous explanations for sudden in-custody deaths 
unconvincing, speculated that electronic control devices may affect 
the body’s acid-based balance thereby increasing the risk of 
acidosis.64 Similarly, the other article speculated that some Taser 
deaths may be attributable to acidosis, but “[i]t [did] not purport to 
establish that causal link and explicitly limits the reach of its 
findings due to its small data set.”65 
 
3. The Rough Contours of a Standard Emerge 
 
In the course of its analysis and rejection of the plaintiff’s 
scientific evidence, the Ninth Circuit never announced a clear test 
for determining a hazard’s knowability, nor did it purport to follow 
one. Indeed, by highlighting the lack of a comprehensive standard 
in California, it did the opposite. But several key questions lay 
beneath Rosa’s analysis: Does the plaintiff’s documentary or 
testimonial evidence pertain directly to the product at issue? And 
does it demonstrate a causal connection using sound science, or 
does it merely hypothesize the link? This approach implicitly 
suggests a test that could offer courts and litigants with basic 
guidance when assessing the knowability of a given risk. 
 
B.  Rejecting the Duty to Test 
 
In addition to their claim that the defendant failed to warn of a 
knowable hazard, the Rosas brought a negligence claim alleging, 
among other things, that the manufacturer failed to adequately test 
63 Rosa v. Taser Int’l., Inc., 684 F.3d 941, 947 (9th Cir. 2012). 
64 Id. at 948. 
65 Id. 
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the product.66 However, the court rejected this claim with little 
discussion because the Rosas produced no evidence concerning the 
reasonableness of Taser’s testing procedures.67 Significantly, the 
court also noted that immediate ventricular fibrillation, and not 
cardiac arrest from metabolic acidosis, was the “perceived cardiac 
risk associated with the device.”68  Because Taser had expended 
significant resources testing for the risk of ventricular fibrillation, 
it had not breached its duty to test.69 
 
III. RECOMMENDATION: A THREE-PART STANDARD FOR 
DETERMINING KNOWABILITY 
 
Implicit in the Rosa decision is the notion that determining 
what was knowable involves determining what scientific theory 
was generally accepted at the time of manufacture. This, along 
with the court’s analysis of the evidence in that case, suggests a 
three-part test for determining knowability: 
First, courts should determine the reliability and admissibility 
of a plaintiff’s scientific evidence—whether testimonial or 
66 Id. at 950. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. (emphasis added). 
69 See id. (The court does not explain how it determined which risk was 
primarily “perceived” at the time, but this conclusion may well have been 
debatable. While Taser may not have perceived the risk of acidosis in 2003, the 
Rosas had already amassed evidence that other observers had: two of the journal 
articles rejected by the court in its knowability analysis had at least suggested 
the possibility that Taser weaponry could cause acidosis); id. at 948 (This raises 
important questions about the duty to test that neither the Rosa court, nor current 
state of products liability law, answers: From whose perspective is the 
perception of risk relevant in a duty to test analysis—the manufacturer’s, or the 
scientific community’s? How widespread must that perception be, and how 
imminent the risk, before the duty is triggered? These considerations suggest a 
relationship between the duties to warn and test that plaintiffs should seek to 
exploit and courts should consider: even if a danger was not “knowable” at the 
time of manufacture because its risk was only hypothesized rather than 
demonstrated, might not that conjecture nonetheless trigger a duty to conduct 
further testing if its source is reliable enough, its perception widespread enough, 
or the consequences of the perceived danger severe enough? The traditional 
reasonableness inquiry in negligence arguably requires that all these factors and 
perspectives be weighed before deciding the standard of care). 
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documentary in nature—by way of the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
Daubert standard. 
Although the Ninth Circuit did not address this in Rosa, 
apparently taking the quality of the research for granted, courts 
should begin a knowability analysis with some assessment of the 
reliability of the evidence put before it. Knowability 
determinations in high-tech industries will turn on scientific 
questions: had expert research adequately demonstrated a causal 
relationship between Taser use and metabolic acidosis at the time 
of Mr. Rosa’s death? Answering such a question will require a 
court not only to assess what a given expert or article says, but also 
how scientifically reliable that expert or article’s conclusions are. 
The classic standard for making this determination was laid down 
by the U.S. Supreme Court in Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals,70 and should have an important place at the 
threshold of any knowability analysis. 
Second, courts should then determine whether the research or 
testimony provided actually pertains to the product in question, or 
whether its applicability to the product is based purely on post-hoc 
conjecture put forth by plaintiff for the purpose of trial. 
This proposed step played a major role in the Rosa analysis as 
the basis for the court’s rejection of plaintiff’s first two articles. 
Although an expert or article may tie a given outcome to a given 
condition or process, it should not affect the manufacturer’s 
constructive knowledge of that danger unless it ties the risk 
directly to the manufacturer’s product. 
Third, courts must determine whether the substance of the 
evidence conveys more than mere conjecture: does it put forth its 
theory of the risk as an untested hypothesis or as a conclusion 
supported by scientific research? 
This third part of the analysis is the most difficult because it 
will create a significant “grey area” between hypothetical and 
adequately supported theories. The Rosa court’s decision was 
perhaps an easy case in this regard because the two articles 
dismissed for their mere hypothetical value actually self-identified 
70 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) (holding that the 
Frye general acceptance test for expert testimony had been superseded by Rule 
702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence). 
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their assertions as such. Neither article purported to establish a 
causal link between Taser use and acidosis. The question could 
become more difficult if the literature supports a theory with some 





In most jurisdictions, a failure-to-warn claim in products 
liability will only succeed if the plaintiff can show that the 
product’s hazard was known or knowable at the time of 
manufacture. Showing knowability, in turn, requires showing that 
the risk was actually known. Although courts sometimes assess the 
evidence of a risk’s knowability in the absence of a comprehensive 
standard, the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Rosa suggests a three part 
test: First, courts should assess the reliability of any scientific 
evidence via the Daubert standard. Second, the evidence must 
pertain to the product in question. And third, the evidence must go 
beyond mere speculation to offer a tested conclusion 




 In most jurisdictions, plaintiffs pursuing a failure-to-warn 
claim must show that the risk at issue was knowable at the 
time of manufacture.  
 To show that a risk was known or knowable, a plaintiff 
should offer testimony from experts within the industry, 
testimony from scientists from a relevant field, or 
documented scientific research that identifies the risk prior 
to the manufacture of the product that caused injury.  
 Courts assessing evidence of a danger’s knowability should 
determine (1) its admissibility by way of the Daubert 
standard, (2) whether it pertains to the product at issue, and 
(3) whether it demonstrates the danger or merely speculates 
as to the risk. 
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